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Abstract: This study examines how within-couple inequalities, that is power differences 
between men and women in a partnership, act as predictors of transitions from full-time to 
part-time employment applying Heckman corrected probit models in three different 
institutional and cultural contexts; Eastern Germany, Western Germany and the United 
Kingdom. The analyses show that when women are in a weaker position within their 
relationships they are more likely to drop-out of full-time work, but that this propensity varies 
by context. The authors also find an increased tendency over time for women to leave full-
time for part-time employment in both Eastern and Western Germany, but observe no such 
trend in the UK. This is suggestive of ongoing incompatibilities in the institutional support for 
equality in dual-earning in Germany. The study uses longitudinal data covering the period 
1992 until 2012 from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for Germany and from the 
British Household Panel (BHPS) and the ‘Understanding Society’ data for the UK. 
 
Key words: Part-time Employment, Family, Wages, Housework, Cross-National Comparison. 
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1. Introduction 
The gender revolution has stalled (England, 2010; Charles, 2011). Empirical research confirms 
that the gender gap in economic outcomes remains:  women continue to earn less than men, 
they work fewer hours in paid employment and they hold jobs of lower occupational worth 
and with less authority (Yaish and Stier, 2009). Many argue that the gender gap in 
employment outcomes will remain as long as women continue to engage in paid employment 
in a manner dissimilar to men. Women’s pursuit of part-time work is singled out as one of the 
primary mechanisms causing gendered employment and occupational segregation (Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2006). Part-time work has been found to decrease women’s bargaining power 
within household negotiations (Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2000) and the size of the part-time 
workforce has been shown to decrease women’s financial contribution to household income 
(Stier and Mandel, 2009). These authors assert that the provision of ‘female friendly’ 
employment conditions, including part-time work, reinforce normative expectations of 
women as primary carers which serve to maintain all women’s economic disadvantage by 
increasing statistical discrimination and occupational segregation. Other researchers place 
the blame elsewhere arguing that an ongoing gender essentialism in the distribution of 
unpaid care work and housework between couples serves to disadvantage women’s 
economic outcomes (Hochschild, 1989; Breen and Cooke, 2005). Indeed some note that 
gender essentialism and a ‘lack of change in the gendering of the personal realm’ are amongst 
the key causes of the stalled gender revolution (England, 2010: 161). Yet others push 
egalitarian ideals aside, suggesting instead that it is economic rationales which are central to 
women’s labour supply decisions. Here the earning capacity or ‘breadwinning status’ of 
women is crucial to an understanding of their labour market behaviour. Women are thought 
to withdraw their (paid) labour, focusing their efforts in household production, while their 
partner invests his efforts in ‘market production’ (Becker, 1985). Our paper engages with the 
multiple strands of this debate examining how both women’s economic standing relative to 
their partners and inequalities in the allocation of unpaid care work impinge on women’s 
transitions to part-time work. We apply Heckman corrected probit models with controls for 
within person correlation regressing the switch between full-time and part-time employment 
on a set of covariates in the base period when our sample consists of women in full-time 
employment. Our models therefore allow us to investigate causal sequence: we estimate 
whether pre-existing within-couple inequalities, are predictive of women’s ‘drop-out’ to part-
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time work at t. This extends previous analyses which were often unable to examine within-
couple inequalities as predictors of outcome, providing additional insights into why women 
appear to ‘self-sabotage’ in their pursuit of forms of employment which are seen to 
perpetuate their economic disadvantage (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006).  
 
The paper is cross-nationally and cross-temporally comparative, examining trends in the 
predictors of female labour supply in three different institutional and cultural contexts: The 
United Kingdom, Eastern and Western Germany. Our three-way comparison, using 
comparable panel data for the UK and Germany, allows for an assessment of variance in the 
structuring effect of key institutions and culture on gendered employment strategies. 
Although Germany and the United Kingdom are similar in their residual institutional support 
for working-motherhood they have very different labour market institutions deemed relevant 
in shaping female labour market behaviour. The German labour market is typically regarded 
as rigid (OECD, 2013) or co-ordinated whereas the UK is often classified as flexible and/or 
liberal (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Our ability to measure the impact of culture on gendered 
behaviour is further enhanced by our separate analysis of Eastern and Western Germany. 
Although Eastern and Western Germany share the same institutional structure, the 
partitioned country has been reunified since 1990, the historical legacy of state socialism in 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR) continues to structure cultural norms pertaining to 
working motherhood in a manner quite different to West-Germany (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). 
Finally, our comparatively long observation period allows us to engage with a literature which 
has long anticipated change in women’s employment behaviour (Crompton, 1999).  
 
We extend the literature in two ways. First, we provide an examination of the relative 
importance of power inequalities between couples in determining her ‘drop-out’ to part-time 
employment, allowing for an understanding of the impact of the ‘personal realm’ on gender 
inequalities in outcome. This is a vital component of the debate which frequently examines 
patterns in individual behavior whilst paying insufficient attention to the structuring effects 
of family dynamics. Second, as far as we are aware, we provide the first comparative analysis 
of how within household inequalities influence her supply, allowing us to identify policy 
pathways for positive change.  
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2. Background 
2.1 How might family dynamics influence women’s market outcomes? Theory and empirical 
evidence 
 
Family dynamics, and in particular, the domestic division of labour are held to be central 
predictors of women’s – especially mothers’ – labour supply. Below we outline how key 
theorists consider the impact of family dynamics on women’s labour supply decisions and 
review the relevant empirical evidence.  
 
Gary Becker (1985) presents us with an ‘economic approach’ to understanding how family 
dynamics could influence her labour supply strategies. He conceptualises a consensual 
division of labour, where he specialises in paid work and she specialises in unpaid work within 
the home. Becker’s (1993) ‘specialisation model’ is presented as mutually beneficial, and 
utility maximising, allowing one partner to specialise in market production and the other 
partner to specialise in home production. This specialisation is deemed to be productivity 
enhancing and beneficial for the entire household unit. Men are portrayed as having stronger 
market-specific human capital endowments (their wages are higher, they occupy better 
occupational positions) which households capitalize on with him devoting more time to 
market work and less time to domestic work. Meanwhile women spend more time in 
domestic work due to their strong ‘biological commitment’ to the care of children and their 
weaker earnings capacity. Becker’s conceptualisation of household dynamics predicts no or 
only marginal involvement in paid work by women and is consistent with women’s reduced 
labour supply and their greater tendency to work part-time. Empirical work confirms 
components of Becker’s specialisation model. Dependent children in the household decrease 
women’s working hours (e.g. Paull, 2008; Misra et al., 2011) as does partner’s income 
(Bernardi, 1999). However, the evidence is more complex when several indicators of within 
couple inequalities are simultaneously analysed. Verbakel et al. (2008), using Dutch data, 
found a positive relationship between a partners’ economic resources and economic 
outcomes for both men and women (contradicting specialization models). Importantly, 
however, these results were specific to couples without children - for couples with children 
their findings continued to confirm household specialization strategies. Bröckel et al. (2015) 
also obtained results which both support and challenge the specialisation model in their 
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analysis of the predictors of progression to top occupational positions in Germany. They 
found women’s outcomes were constrained by their partner’s economic resources but not 
vice versa (supporting specialisation).  
 
Oppenheimer (1982; 1997), who also adopts an economic approach, argues that Becker’s 
specialization model is problematic in its placement of the economic security of the 
household on the wage of one worker. She suggests that households gain greater economic 
security when both adults work. Her argument is gaining greater credence given declines in 
job security (Kalleberg, 2006), stagnating real wages and job polarization (Goos and Manning, 
2007) which, in combination, suggest a decline in households’ ability to rely on one income 
stream. While the general trend of increased female labour supply in Western societies has 
partly been attributed to men’s reduced earning power since the 1980s (Esping-Andersen, 
2009), some have argued that women’s employment is more centrally determined by their 
own earnings capacity (England, 2005). Indeed, evidence from the United States suggests a 
strengthening of the positive relationship between a woman’s education and her 
employment probabilities over time, and a decline in the negative effect of her husband’s 
earnings on her employment (Schwartz, 2010).  
 
While Becker (1985) proposes a consensual framework of household specialisation, game 
theoretic models characterise within household dynamics as conflictual. From this 
perspective, also put forth by sociological exchange theorists (e.g. Bittmann et al., 2003), 
couples routinely argue over who is responsible for what, with each partner’s resources 
(economic, social and or cultural) deployed to enhance their relative bargaining position in 
such negotiations. Theorists from this perspective suggest that the economically weaker 
partner will have decreased labour supply as a consequence of their disproportionate 
responsibility for domestic work. Game theoretic models of household dynamics predict 
stability in gender inequalities in paid employment, with women expected to be the losers of 
most household bargaining discussions until their earning capacity is on a par with men’s and 
men increase their domestic labour (Breen and Cooke, 2005). Indeed almost all research on 
the distribution of domestic duties within the home confirmed that women do the lion’s share 
(Bianchi et al., 2000; Gershuny et al., 2005).  
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Gender theorists, by contrast, argue that it is norms and values, rather than economic 
rationales or the victors of arguments over relative contributions to household production, 
which determine her lower supply as well as households’ distribution of paid and unpaid 
labour (see e.g. Shelton and John, 1996 for a review).  
 
West and Zimmerman (1987) regard all action as gendered and claim that couples, both 
consciously and unconsciously, act within tightly prescribed codes of conduct which assert 
gender appropriate allocations of paid market work and unpaid care and housework. They 
predict little deviation from gendered codes of conduct, and even in instances when gendered 
norms are consciously contested, research finds that many men refuse to assume more 
egalitarian allocations of paid and unpaid labour. In her classic study, Hochschild (1989) 
describes the emotional and cognitive transition of her female interviewees from actively 
pursuing equality of domestic work to resigning themselves to assuming the majority of 
domestic tasks as a result of their partners’ refusal to share the dual-shift. Duncan et al. (2003) 
note that gendered moral rationalities, which are based on situational logics, account for 
women’s motivations to engage in paid and unpaid work. They found large proportions of 
mothers regarded caring at home to be more important than paid work and found that many 
women, especially those with weak employment prospects,  regarded their roles as mothers 
as more morally valuable, and therefore important, than their working-selves.  
 
While many studies note that gender norms are persistent and continue to dictate 
household’s earning strategies, some comparative researchers have argued and empirically 
shown that there are important differences in gendered behaviour and attitudes by national-
institutional context (Pfau-Effinger 1998; Cooke 2006; O’Reilly et al., 2014). Their evidence 
suggests that policy and history structure the gender contract between men and women and 
that they are, therefore, open to change (O’Reilly et al., 2014).  
 
Many of the theories reviewed here lead us to expect a maintenance of gender inequality in 
the distribution of paid and unpaid work within couples. Though these theories differ in the 
assumed underlying mechanisms – household utility maximization, household bargaining or 
gender norms – they all predict a similar outcome: women will continue to do the lion’s share 
of housework and childcare to the detriment of their labour supply whereas men’s main effort 
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will go into market work until women’s earnings are on a par with men’s and/or until social 
norms change. Two theoretical perspectives, however, predict a decline in specialization: One 
is Oppenheimer’s ‘economic needs’ theory which holds that most couples can no longer 
afford to specialize and rely on one (main) earner due to changing labour market conditions 
and decreased job security. The other is a comparative perspective which has shown policy 
and historical context matters, with countries with institutional support for working-
motherhood offering more egalitarian alternatives to specialization.  
 
While there has been some research on the effect of within-couple inequalities on women’s 
labour supply (e.g. Verbakel, et al. 2008; Bröckel, et al. 2015), there is no cross-nationally and 
cross-temporally comparative work on the topic. One of our key contributions to the 
literature concerns our attempts to identify cross-national and cross-temporal variance in the 
role of within household inequalities (in terms of earnings’ and housework contributions) on 
partnered women’s switches between full-time and part-time employment. We review cross-
national variance in working-strategies within households below.  
 
2.2 Cross-national variance in working-strategies within households 
We expect the institutional configurations and the gender normative context of each country 
case to shape household working and earning strategies and to reinforce or weaken the 
gendered patterns of paid and unpaid labour within the home. Below, we review the main 
institutional (macro-level) factors we expect to interact with the household (micro-level) 
determinants of women’s labour supply. The macro-factors reviewed have been found by 
others to be important predictors of female market outcome (e.g. Dieckhoff et al. 2015, 
Mandel 2009). Employment protection is reviewed as employment protection supports 
household specialization by decreasing the risk that the primary earner will lose his/her job 
and income stream. Unemployment protection also matters in this regard as it provides 
income – though reduced – after job-loss. Similarly, trade unions support household 
specialization by protecting the job of the primary earner and by compressing wages, which 
allows more families – especially also those of low earners – to live on one ‘family’ wage. 
Conversely, the provision of good quality and affordable childcare is expected to decrease 
specialisation by enabling her supply. We also expect the general nature and quality of part-
time jobs to matter for women’s decision to reduce their working time. Taxation policies are 
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another central macro-level factor likely to affect women’s decision to switch from full-time 
to part-time employment. Finally, national gender cultures are expected to crucially structure 
working-strategies.  
 
National Gender Cultures   
After the end of the Second World War Germany was partitioned. Western Germany was 
governed by a democratically elected government with a social market economy, whereas 
Eastern Germany was governed by a socialist state that sought to integrate women into full-
time work. Upon reunification, the GDR saw its institutional framework overthrown and 
replaced by the framework of the Western German state. This also involved a curtailment of 
policies which supported working motherhood and a ‘reversion towards a less gender-equal 
division of labour in the East’ (Trappe et al., 2015: 233). Though Eastern Germany now has 
the same institutional framework as Western Germany important differences remain: public 
sector employment constitutes a larger share of total employment and there is better 
childcare availability in Eastern Germany for children of less than three years (ibid.). While 
researchers have witnessed some convergence in the labour supply of Eastern and Western 
German women (Simonson et al., 2011), differences persist pointing to the importance and 
perseverance of culture and social norms (Trappe et al., 2015). We therefore expect the 
greater egalitarianism of the former GDR to decrease gender essentialism in the personal 
realm increasing her supply and equalising her earnings capacity. We anticipate gender norms 
to be the most essentialist in Western Germany, and expect the UK to be located between 
both German case studies. This expectation is based on existent work analysing attitudes 
towards working mothers, placing the UK between Eastern and Western Germany, depending 
on the presence and age of children in the household (Treas and Widmer, 2000: Table 1, 1420 
f.).  
 
Employment and Unemployment Protection   
German workers employed on permanent contracts enjoy a substantially higher level of 
protection than in the UK, and we anticipate the higher level of employment protection in 
Germany to support specialisation to a greater extent. The UK has a more precarious labour 
market, with weaker employment protection legislation, and we expect households to be 
financially less able to rely on one earner’s wage (even if specialisation is their preferred 
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option). The OECD has developed indicators, ranging from 0-6, to quantify the strictness of 
employment protection and regulation and enable cross-national comparison. On the 
indicator measuring the strictness of employment protection of permanent jobs, Germany 
currently scores 2.9 whereas the UK scores 1.20, the German ranking is above the OECD 
average of 2.15, whereas the UK falls below it (OECD, 2013). Over the time period under study 
in this article this indicator in Germany and the UK has been very stable, increasing only 
slightly. However, there has been considerable change in the regulation of temporary 
contracts in Germany, from 3.3 to 1.0 and little change over time in the UK (where regulation 
of these contracts has always been very low). Despite these time trends, temporary work 
continues to be more regulated in Germany than in the UK.  
 
Unemployment benefits can also be seen to support specialisation as they allow households 
to rely on one earner’s wage. Unemployment benefits provide both financial security during 
an unemployment spell as well as a “search subsidy” (Burdett, 1979) enabling unemployed 
job-seekers to search for adequate re-employment thereby reducing unemployment scarring. 
German unemployed workers receive higher unemployment benefits than their British 
counterparts and also receive these for a longer duration. However, the German benefit 
system has undergone substantial changes as a result of the Hartz IV reforms (2005), which 
have reduced the duration of receipt of income-related benefits and increased conditionality. 
This may have decreased household specialisation over time. However, despite the Hartz IV 
reforms benefits in Germany are still more generous than in the UK.   
   
Unions and Collective Bargaining Coverage 
Germany has substantially higher collective bargaining coverage than the UK (though 
coverage in Western Germany is notably larger than in Eastern Germany, see Ellguth and 
Kohaut, 2015). Unions are thought to reinforce employment protection legislation and 
compress wages. Both of these ‘union outcomes’ are expected to create a more favourable 
context for specialisation. Moreover, through the promotion of wage compression, unions 
can be expected to be especially relevant for households where the husband is low-skilled. In 
Germany, where unions are comparatively strong, low skilled households are more likely to 
be able to afford to live on his wage than in the UK. However, collective bargaining coverage 
has been decreasing drastically in both countries during our observation period: from 85 to 
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61 percent in Germany, and from 54 to 31 percent in the UK (Visser, 2013). The most drastic 
change in both countries occurred in the early 1990s, by 1995 coverage had dropped to 36 
percent in the UK and 76 percent in Germany. Whereas the decline stagnated in the UK (only 
decreasing by 5 percentage points since), the rate of decline in Germany has not changed 
(ibid.). Despite these changes, collective bargaining coverage is still twice as high in Germany 
compared to the UK.  
 
Taxation Policies 
There are also strong differences between Germany and the UK in their taxation of married 
couples. In Germany married couples (as well as the unmarried parents of dependent 
children) can choose to be taxed jointly with full income splitting, whilst in the UK married 
couples are effectively taxed like single households (Bach et al., 2013). The German system of 
full-income splitting implies ‘a lower tax burden for married couples compared to individual 
taxation if household income is unequally distributed between spouses’ (Steiner and 
Wrohlich, 2006: 3). Full income splitting has been identified as one of the reasons for the 
comparatively low labour force participation of German women (Bach et al., 2013), and is also 
held to encourage part-time work. 
 
Quality and Nature of Part-Time Employment 
Women’s decision to move from full-time to part-time work may also be affected by the 
nature and quality of part-time positions available. Labour market institutions and macro-
level context are likely to affect the nature and quality of part-time work (Gallie et al., 2016; 
Roeters and Craig, 2014). Gallie et al. (2016) in their cross-national comparative study of 
female part-time work show that occupational segregation of part-time employment is 
substantially less pronounced in the German context compared to the British one and that 
this lower degree of segregation is associated with a lower degree of part-time disadvantage. 
The authors also argue that the timing of the growth of part-time employment may also 
matter for the quality of part-time work (ibid.: 6): in Germany much of the growth in part-
time employment occurred after the introduction of the EU Directive on Part-time Work in 
1997, which stipulates the non-discrimination of part-time workers based on their working 
hours, while in the UK the growth of the part-time labour market preceded the EU Directive 
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on part-time work. While the findings by Gallie et al. (2016) pertain to intrinsic measures of 
job quality, McGinnity and McManus (2007) also find the part-time wage penalty to be 
substantially lower in Germany compared to the UK. It has to be noted, though, that the 
generation of marginal part-time employment which is precarious and detrimental for long-
term career and earnings prospects has been facilitated through the German Hartz II reforms. 
These reforms were introduced in 2003 and reduced social security contributions for marginal 
part-time employment, which has grown notably since.  
 
Childcare.  
Mothers’ willingness and ability to engage in full-time work is generally thought to be 
determined by their access to, as well as their ability to afford the costs of, childcare. Neo-
classical models regard childcare costs as central, reducing women’s net wages and lowering 
their participation in full-time employment (Heckman, 1974). Others argue that in contexts 
where public providers dominate the delivery of childcare, ‘availability’ is more crucial in 
shaping female supply (Hank and Kreyenfeld, 2003). In Germany private childcare providers 
are rare and public childcare provision – especially for children below three years of age – 
does not meet demand (ibid.). In the UK, it is mainly the high costs of childcare that affect 
female labour supply (Chevalier and Viitanen, 2002). Not surprisingly then, attendance hours 
for British and German children are low: in 2005, for example, the average hours of 
attendance were 16 in the UK and 23 in Germany (OECD, 2012). There are also important 
differences between Eastern and Western Germany, with better childcare coverage for small 
children in the East (see Trappe et al., 2015). Notwithstanding the better availability of 
childcare in the East, both Germany and the UK are regularly identified as national contexts 
where inadequate childcare provision increases women’s supply to part-time work by 
inhibiting their ability to work full-time (e.g. Gash, 2009). We thus expect the presence of 
small children to increase the likelihood that women transition from full-time to part-time. 
Time-series information on childcare provision is difficult to obtain (Dieckhoff et al., 2015), 
but OECD data for the years between 2003 and 2010 seems to suggest that average 
enrolment rates have increased substantially over time: from 9 to 23 percent in Germany, 
and from 27 to 42 percent in the UK (OECD, 2012).  
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
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Our hypotheses concerning female labour supply incorporate considerations of within-couple 
inequalities in the personal realm, as well as their interaction with institutional and national 
cultural context.  
 
We expect relative earnings inequalities within couples will affect her supply, and that women 
who earn more than their partner or have similar earnings to their partners will have few 
economic incentives to decrease their hours while those who earn less than their partners 
will be more likely to leave full-time for part-time employment (Hypothesis 1a). However, this 
will depend on his absolute earnings – if his earnings are low placing the household at risk of 
in-work poverty, women with lower proportional earnings will not be able to reduce their 
working hours (Hypothesis 1b).  
 
We also predict inequalities in housework allocation to influence her supply: women who are 
left with the majority share of housework are more likely to make the transition from full-
time to part-time work (Hypothesis 2). A similar effect is hypothesised for the presence of 
(young) children (Hypothesis 3).  
 
We expect the mechanisms outlined in Hypotheses 1 to 3 to be moderated by institutional 
and cultural context. We expect variation in the dominance of household specialisation by 
case, and predict the egalitarian gender culture of Eastern Germany to reduce the tendency 
for household specialisation compared to Western Germany and the UK. We therefore 
hypothesise fewer transitions to part-time work for women with lower proportional earnings 
in Eastern Germany compared to both, Western Germany and the UK (Hypothesis 4a).  By 
contrast, it is assumed that in Western Germany and the UK there is a preference for 
specialisation - at least amongst couples where she is the secondary earner - and that whether 
this preference can be realised hinges strongly on economic feasibility.  We hypothesise a 
greater tendency for women with lower proportional earnings to reduce their labour supply 
in Western Germany compared to the UK as in Germany the standard employment contract 
enjoys higher levels of protection and wage compression makes it more likely that households 
can afford to rely on one wage, while higher levels of unemployment protection also act as 
safe-guard of family income in case of job loss. We predict this difference between West 
Germany and the UK also to be driven by the German system of tax splitting which creates 
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financial disincentives for married women with lower earnings than their partner to work full-
time. The more favourable part-time conditions and lower pay penalties in the German 
context may also mean that economically it is more feasible for German secondary earners 
compared to those in the UK to leave full-time for part-time employment. In sum, we expect 
the macro-level differences between Germany and the UK to lead to higher transition rates 
of female secondary earners in Western Germany (Hypothesis 4b). 
 
We expect a similar pattern across our three cases when it comes to inequality in housework 
allocation: whereas in Western Germany her higher share of housework is hypothesised to 
reduce her labour supply, we expect this effect to be less pronounced in the UK, due to 
economic insecurity, and in Eastern Germany, given the cultural legacy of the GDR which 
created a normative expectation of full-time employment for women (Hypothesis 5).  
 
We expect young children will be less predictive of female supply in Eastern Germany, 
compared to both Western Germany and the UK, due to its more egalitarian gender culture 
and its superior coverage of childcare for young children (Hypothesis 6).  
 
During the twenty-year period examined here, the countries under study have undergone 
considerable institutional change. Employment and household income has become less 
secure in each case, though the changes have been greater in Germany due to the 
deregulation of temporary work, the decline in collective bargaining coverage as well the 
substantial reforms of the unemployment benefit system, making it more likely that economic 
needs encourage women to work full-time. At the same time childcare availability for small 
children has increased in Western Germany and the UK, making full-time employment of both 
partners more feasible. In sum, these developments suggest that we might observe a general 
trend of partnered women being less likely to make the transition to part-time over time. 
(Hypothesis 7a). Whilst there have been notable institutional changes, other macro-level 
factors have been remarkably stable: women’s earnings are still not on a par with men’s and 
social norms have been changing very slowly. This would lead us to expect that bargaining 
strategies, utility maximisation, and doing gender at the household level have changed little 
over time. Moreover, taxation policies have not changed notably, and in the case of Germany 
full income splitting is still in place creating disincentives for married women’s full-time work. 
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So it might be that stability in household specialisation strategies counter the anticipated 
effects of institutional change leading to no or little change over time in her transitions to 
part-time employment (Hypothesis 7b), particularly in the German context where taxation 
policies continue to encourage specialisation.  
 
3. Operationalisation and Estimation Strategy 
The paper uses twenty years of panel data from three different datasets. It uses the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1992-2012, and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
1992-2008, and the BHPS sample which segues into Understanding Society - the United 
Kingdom Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) 2008-2012. The datasets are state-of-the-art, 
nationally representative longitudinal panel surveys (Wagner et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2010), 
and are cross-nationally comparable in their measurement of key variables.  
 
Our dependent variable measures transitions between t-1 and t from full-time to part-time 
employment, with women who remained in full-time employment across two consecutive 
time periods constituting the reference category. We define part-time as working less than 
35 hours a week in their main job.1 The analyses draw on repeat cross-sections of the full 
twenty-year panel sequence to maximise the sample of employment transitions and to test 
for variation over time. Our paper applies probit models which regress the switch from full-
time to part-time on our set of covariates that are measured at t-1. Standard errors are 
clustered to account for multiple observations per person. Our empirical strategy offers us 
the opportunity to account for a good portion of female heterogeneity, in both observed and 
unobserved characteristics, with our entire sample in full-time employment at t-1. We then 
examine how variables at t-1 may increase or decrease the risk of leaving full-time 
employment for part-time employment at t. It is through this observation of a change in 
labour force status between t-1 and t, while controlling for covariates measured at t-1, that 
we approach an understanding of causal processes which can be difficult without panel data 
                                                          
1 Both, statistical bodies and empirical work, have used varying cut-offs to define part-time employment (see 
e.g. discussion in Roeters and Craig, 2014). While the 35 hour cut-off employed here allows us include long-hour 
part-time jobs in our analysis of part-time employment, some might prefer a more conservative definition of 
part-time employment at 30 hours per week. We ran tests to determine whether our results were sensitive to a 
more conservative cut-off and found them to be similar to the ones presented here (results available upon 
request).  
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(Stier and Mandel, 2009; Raley et al., 2006). Our empirical analysis therefore offers an 
important contribution to the literature where some have suggested that gender inequalities 
arise because women pursue part-time jobs (e.g. Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2000: 391; Stier 
and Mandel, 2009: 596), when it may also be that pre-existing gender inequalities are the 
drivers of women’s pursuit of part-time work. We believe that suggestions to women to ‘lean-
in’ by remaining in full-time employment are better served by an understanding of the 
conditions that precede their ‘drop-out’ to part-time2. Our definition of part-time 
employment captures heterogeneous employment positions – in terms of quality as well as 
in the number of hours worked (see discussion under 2.2.). However, while not all part-time 
positions should be considered to be a step-down from full-time work, empirical research is 
clear that, on average, part-time positions are of inferior quality in terms of pay, on the job 
training and career prospects compared to full-time jobs (McGinnity and McManus 2007; 
Gregory and Connolly, 2008). As such, women’s disproportionate entry to part-time work 
does constitute an important dimension of gender inequality in the labour market. 
Throughout this article we assert that women make an active decision to work part-time, but 
that this choice may be made under conditions of constraint and for this reason we test how 
within household inequalities might be predictive of her ‘drop-out’. Official statistics show 
that the vast majority of part-time workers are voluntary (more than 88 percent in the case 
of Germany, and more than 86 percent in the case of the UK; OECD, 2016). We are aware 
though that part-time work is not always entered voluntarily – especially in times of economic 
crisis (Warren, 2015). Finally, as noted above, part-time work is also heterogeneous in the 
number of hours worked. In our sample of women who switch from full-time to part-time 
employment, marginal employment (defined as less than 15 hours) is rare in each country 
case representing 10 percent of cases in the UK and Eastern Germany and 13 percent of cases 
in Western Germany. In Western and Eastern Germany long hours part-time (30 to 34 hours) 
is the most common destination accounting for 45 and 63 percent of cases respectively and 
31 percent in the UK.  3 
 
                                                          
2 The paper also conducts robustness tests on our construct measurement by examining whether our central 
explanatory variables are also predictive of women’s transitions in the ‘opposite direction’, to full-time from 
part-time work. These can be found in the appendix (Table A2).  
3 Estimates based on our sample used for the multivariate estimations. 
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Our probit models correct for selectivity into employment (Heckman 1979). Our Heckman 
selection models include age, nationality, education and a dummy if a child was born in t-1. 
The inclusion of a control for a new born child allows us to correct for selectivity into fertility. 
This was particularly important for our Western German case, where many women with new-
born children would not be found in full-time employment given its gender culture 
surrounding working-motherhood and its extensive maternity leave provision. The negative 
selection term for Western Germany (see table 1) indicates that women who are observed in 
employment are less likely to move from full-time to part-time compared to a random sample 
of all women. The positive effect in the UK is less intuitive4, but the high level of significance 
shows that it is important to control for selectivity into employment in both countries.  
 
We applied the following selections prior to analysis: Given our focus on within household 
inequalities we drop women who are not in partnerships, given our interest in the interface 
between household inequalities and female employment we only include women aged 20-59 
years. In the multivariate analyses, some additional restrictions apply: We select working 
women in full-time employment at t-1 with positive labour income, given our interest in 
relative earnings on her switches to part-time employment. Women who do not have full 
partner information are also excluded, as we aim to investigate how power inequalities 
between couples might affect her supply. We drop those who do not have a minimum of two 
consecutive periods of employment, because we want to measure the causal sequence in her 
transitions to part-time work from full-time work. Table A1 in the appendix shows a transition 
matrix for the entire dataset of women in partnerships (not selecting on positive labour 
income). For Eastern Germany 38 per cent of the sample was in full-time employment across 
t-1 and t, and 3 per cent made a transition from full-time to part-time work. In Western 
Germany 20 per cent of women were in full-time work across t-1 and t, while 2 per cent made 
a transition from full-time to part-time. In the UK 31 per cent of women were in full-time 
                                                          
4 It is very important to note here that we performed a test, available from the authors on request, which 
included women who had previously been full-time workers but were on maternity leave from these positions 
for our UK sample. Such a test is not possible with the German data. Our UK models were robust to the inclusion 
of women on maternity leave in our sample of full-time workers, however, the Inverse Mills Ratio lost its 
significance in these tests. This suggests that our selection models are effectively controlling for the selectivity 
surrounding fertility and maternity leave in the UK data. As the German data does not allow us to include women 
on maternity leave in our sample of working women, we exclude them in both data sets to ensure comparable 
results across countries. 
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employment across t-1 and t, while 5 per cent made a transition to part-time. As can be seen 
in table A1 women don’t only make a transition to part-time from full-time employment -  a 
relatively large proportion of women also leaves inactivity (here inactivity includes 
unemployment) to enter part-time work. This represents 3, 4 and 2 per cent of our Eastern 
and Western German and UK samples respectively. It should be noted that it is only in 
Western Germany where more women enter part-time work from inactivity than from full-
time work. We do not include women in inactivity in our estimations given our focus on 
variation in earning power on women’s likelihood to leave full-time for part-time employment 
rather than on the integrating potential of part-time employment. Our transition matrix 
differs from that of O’Reilly and Bothfeld (2002) who find higher proportions of part-time 
workers making transitions to and from inactivity. This is probably due to their different data 
window (1991-1995). Our data window begins in 1992 for all three cases under study and 
continues until 2012. However, our multivariate analyses for the UK stop in 2008 as this is the 
final year of the BHPS before it segued into the UKHLS. Once the panel was resumed in the 
UKHLS two of the key variables in our multivariate analyses, housework and educational level, 
were measured differently. This meant that we could not match the BHPS and UKHLS for our 
longitudinal multivariate analyses. However, we did match the BHPS and UKHLS for our 
descriptive analyses where there is no issue of non-comparability.5 
 
Our central measure of within-couple inequality is breadwinning status, which measures the 
relative economic contributions of each partner to household income. We do not 
conceptualise breadwinning in terms of working-time as others have before us (Haas et al., 
2006) and argue that pay differentials between spouses offer a more direct measure of 
economic inequalities within households than working-time differences. This is supported by 
the work of Smith (2005) who found considerable inequalities in occupational status between 
couples with a shared working-time status. Our definition of breadwinning status follows that 
of Nock (2001) who classifies ‘marriages of equally dependent spouses’ as relationships where 
each partner generates between 40 and 59 percent of total family earnings, with a similar 
                                                          
5 The UKHLS does not provide a measure for the highest level of educational qualifications that is consistent with 
its measurement in the BHPS, it also does not provide a measure of education that is calibrated according to the 
international standard of educational classifications (ISCED). Also, while the UKHLS collects information on 
housework every two years, the BHPS asked it annually.    
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threshold adopted by Raley et al. (2006) and Winslow-Bowe (2006; 2009). Our categorisation 
of economic contribution follows the same logic: we define breadwinners (male or female) as 
those earning at least 60 percent of total household income, equal-earners as those earning 
more than 40 percent and less than 60 percent and define secondary earners as those earning 
less than 40 percent of household income. In line with previous work, we focus on earned 
income rather than income from other sources (i.e. Nock 2001), though we extend our 
definition by including a measure of the poverty status of the household by considering 
whether the partner earns enough to push the family above the poverty line. We do this to 
test whether the behaviour of secondary earners is equivalent in poor and non-poor 
households, with the expectation that secondary earners’ likelihood to remain in full-time 
employment will be higher in poorer households where their economic contribution might 
make a crucial difference to the living conditions of their families. For that purpose we define 
households as 'poor' when the main earner’s labour income is less than 60 percent of annual 
national median equivalized household income. We measure inequalities in non-pecuniary 
contributions to household production, distinguishing between parity in housework, 
instances where the female partner contributes more hours and those where the male 
partner does more housework. In light of ongoing gender differences in childcare, we examine 
the impact of the presence of small children in the household on partnered women’s labour 
market transitions. We use the categorical information available in the data sets and are able 
to distinguish between the number of children aged: 4 years and younger, between 5 and 11 
years and between 12 and 18 years. Finally, our models also control for household income, 
educational homogamy, changes in partner’s income, changes in partners’ working-time 
status, as well as a series of standard socio-economic predictors of women’s labour market 
outcomes: age, migration status, unemployment experience, changes in marital status, 
occupational group, firm-size and employment sector.  
 
4. FINDINGS 
4.1 Descriptive Evidence 
<Figure 1 Here> 
Figure 1 presents the breadwinning strategies of couples, a powerful indicator of women’s 
economic status within the personal realm. The figures show the proportion of women in 
each country over time who are: Breadwinners (she earns at least 60 percent of total gross 
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household wages); secondary earners (she earns less than 40 percent of total gross household 
wages); and equal dual-earners. We further distinguish households by the earnings capacity 
of the male partner and define a household as 'poor' if the partner earns less than 60 percent 
of the median equivalized household income. In Eastern Germany women were more likely 
to be equal dual-earners in the first half of the observation period, though by the second half 
of the observation period we note a strong decline in equal-earning. In Western Germany 
there is stability in breadwinning strategies with most women being secondary earners 
throughout the observation period. Finally, the UK is similar to Western Germany, in its trends 
and in its proportions of women by breadwinning type: most working women tend to be non-
poor secondary earners, 50-60 percent of the sample, the second most common group are 
equal dual-earners accounting for 20 percent, and female breadwinners constitute a minority 
group. Table A3 presents further descriptive statistics of our other measure of within-
household inequality: housework. We find no evidence of parity in housework allocation 
though there is evidence of some positive change. Table A3 also shows between-couple 
earned income differences at the mean, which again confirm the extent of women’s marginal 
economic status within households. To sum up the descriptive evidence, we find most women 
earn less than 40 percent of household income and see no evidence of a positive trend 
towards parity between couples in earning, rather our evidence on earnings is suggestive of 
a reversal of progress in gender equality for women in partnerships.  
 
4.2 Predictors of Transitions to Part-time  
Table 1 presents the predictors of transitions from full-time into part-time employment to 
determine the role of pre-existent within-couple inequalities on her market outcomes.  As 
stated above, all covariates are measured in the base period when the woman is working full-
time. We show estimated coefficients in our tables.6 
 
<Table 1 here> 
Women’s relative earnings, their breadwinning status, are predictive of women’s ‘drop-out’ 
to part-time work. If a woman’s earnings are lower than that of her partner, her secondary 
earner status significantly increases the likelihood that she will drop-out of full-time 
                                                          
6 Full results including all coefficient estimates for the complete specification can be obtained upon request. 
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employment, as predicted by Hypothesis 1a. We find this to be true in all cases under study. 
However, this finding varies by the absolute earnings of the household, as anticipated by 
Hypothesis 1b. Female secondary earners in poor households are unlikely to ‘drop-out’ to 
part-time. Calculating the marginal effects from the coefficients presented we find for the UK 
that non-poor secondary earners have a 7 percent higher probability to switch from full-time 
to part-time. The marginal effects for Western and Eastern Germany are 10 percent and 4 
percent respectively (the marginal effects are not presented in the tables). Although we 
observe some variance across our three cases in the extent to which secondary earner status 
shapes female labour supply (confirming Hypothesis 4a and 4b), these differences are less 
marked than we had expected. This may suggest that perceptions of partners’ (and thereby 
households’) economic security are not very sensitive to institutional setting.  
 
We had also expected equal dual-earners, women with similar economic contributions to 
household income, to be less likely to drop out to part-time. However, we only found this to 
be true of our more gender equal case study, Eastern Germany, suggesting that economic 
rationales are moderated by cultural context. We also find, surprisingly, that female 
breadwinners in poor households are more likely to decrease their working-hours compared 
to female breadwinners in non-poor households.7  
 
We find that gender inequalities in housework also structure her supply. Women who engage 
in more housework than their male partners are significantly more likely to leave full-time for 
part-time work in the UK (though only at the .10 level) and Western Germany. The lack of 
significance of housework on her supply in Eastern Germany is in line with our predictions 
(Hypothesis 5). We had also expected that increased economic needs would prevent British 
women from decreasing their supply but find no strong confirmation of this.  
 
Some of the strongest determinants of women’s transitions to part-time concern the 
presence, age and number of children in the household (confirming Hypothesis 3). Children 
between the ages of zero and four have the strongest impact, with the exception of Eastern 
                                                          
7 Tests revealed this result to be driven by women in households whose husbands are not in full-time 
employment, this suggests either that they choose to decrease their hours to spend time with their partners, or 
that this segment of the workforce is exposed to involuntary part-time employment. 
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Germany, with a strongly significant coefficient and an estimated marginal effect of 13 
percent for both the UK and Western Germany. That children would increase the risk of 
transition to part-time in Western Germany and the UK, but not in Eastern Germany (because 
of the gender culture supportive of working motherhood and better childcare availability) was 
predicted by Hypothesis 6. Notably, though, once children are of school going age (and the 
duration of care is often dramatically reduced with schools frequently closing earlier than 
Kindergardens do), the presence of children does increase Eastern German women’s switches 
to part-time.   
 
Finally, we investigate significance in time trends. Examining changes in her tendency to 
‘drop-out’ to part-time employment and our key predictors over time. Oppenheimer’s 
economic needs theory suggests that households’ increased economic needs will decrease 
her ‘drop-out’ to part-time work, which we anticipated would be most likely in Germany 
(especially in the West) given the extent of its macro-institutional change (Hypothesis 7a). We 
find – quite in contrast to this prediction – that in both regions of Germany there is a small 
but significant positive trend for women to ‘drop-out’ from full-time to part-time 
employment. Alternative measures of time, as dichotomous variables – with tests done on a 
variety of different cut-offs, did not change this result. This suggests quite clearly that the 
economic needs hypothesis finds no support in either region of Germany (Hypothesis 7a). 
Though the non-significance of our time trends for the UK confirms our expectation of no to 
little change in household specialisation (Hypothesis 7b). That we find a positive time trend 
in Eastern and Western German is suggestive of increased specialisation, an unanticipated 
finding given existent theory. However, it is in line with a general trend of sharply increasing 
female part-time during recent decades (see e.g. Kreyenfeld and Geisler, 2006). We also 
tested for changes in key predictors over time by interacting them with time, and again 
carried out these tests using a variety of transformations of time. We were only able to 
observe two significant time trends in these tests, they were: a very small (0.07 and 0.01) 
tendency for children to be more predictive of transitions to part-time over time in Western 
and Eastern Germany respectively.  
 
4.3 Model fit and additional tests 
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We examined the relative predictive impact of our measures of within-couple inequalities by 
conducting a series of log likelihood ratio tests on model fit for a series of nested models with 
and without our key predictors (Table 1). Each of our key variables significantly improved 
model fit for each country case examined, except for housework allocation in Eastern 
Germany and the UK. In the UK and Western Germany, the number of children in the 
household held the most explanatory power in determining transitions to part-time 
employment, but in Eastern Germany breadwinning status was the most determinant. 
Housework allocation had the least explanatory power overall. Finally, we examine the 
robustness of our construct measurement by examining whether our explanatory variables 
are also predictive of women’s transitions in the ‘opposite direction’, to full-time from part-
time work. Our results confirm that between-couple inequalities are strong predictors of 
women’s labour market transitions for a slightly different sample: womens’ breadwinning 
status was predictive of her transitions to full-time; with female breadwinners in non-poor 
households the most likely to leave part-time for full-time employment. Eastern Germany was 
the exception here. We found women who did an unequal share of housework to be 
constrained in part-time employment and found the presence of children in the home to 
decrease her switches from part-time to full-time employment (results in appendix Table A2). 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Many eminent sociologists have examined trends in women’s employment patterns and have 
concluded that the gender revolution has stalled with a decline in the trend towards equalised 
outcomes between men and women (England, 2010; Charles, 2011). A central argument of 
these theorists is that there is a persistence of gender essentialism in the personal realm, and 
that this gender essentialism is one of the primary causes of the stalled revolution (ibid.). In 
addition to these concerns are those of scholars who assert that when women choose to work 
part-time (in jobs that are often of lower occupational worth), they reinforce gendered 
occupational segregation. This is the source of the so called ‘welfare-state paradox’ (Mandel 
and Semyonov, 2006), where governments with policies supportive of ‘female employment’, 
read part-time work, are accused of maintaining the gender gap in pay and occupational 
status by allowing women to work in ‘gendered occupational enclaves’. In this paper we 
sought to understand why women pursue part-time jobs and thereby ‘self-sabotage’, and 
what impact family dynamics and within-couple inequalities have on such transitions. We 
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chose to look at women who were in full-time employment, to determine why women may 
not just chose part-time work, but might ‘drop-out’ from full-time employment to a part-time 
position and the inferior working-conditions frequently associated with part-time jobs. We 
did so by measuring predictors of transitions from full-time to part-time employment one 
year before a transition was made and measured the impact of within-couple inequalities in 
the personal realm on her ‘drop-out’ to part-time work, controlling for typical socio-
demographic characteristics. Our paper also examined the impact of institutional and cultural 
context in its comparative analyses of outcomes in the UK and Germany. We further 
distinguished between Eastern and Western Germany given our interest in examining the 
extent to which the historical legacies of the GDR continue to support egalitarian cultural 
norms. The comparative analysis allows us to investigate variance in ‘doing gender’ by 
context. The paper offers very strong evidence of the explanatory power of within-couple 
inequalities in the personal realm on her labour market outcomes. This suggests that women 
are not engaging in ‘self-sabotage’ but are rather responding to pre-existing inequalities in 
the home. Women were considerably more likely to ‘drop-out’ from their full-time jobs if their 
economic standing relative to their partners was weak. This finding is particularly troubling 
given the high proportion of women who are economically weak compared to their partners 
and given that this proportion has been stable overtime. Our evidence showed that the 
majority of working women are secondary earners, with their wages contributing less than 40 
percent of total household income. We also found that while equal-earning was most 
common in the gender egalitarian context of Eastern Germany for the first half of the 
observation period, this egalitarian tendency was in decline in the second half of our 
observation period. Moreover, parity in housework seems like an unachievable feminist ideal: 
only 5-14 percent of couples report equal housework contributions. This figure is all the more 
concerning as women who do the majority share of housework have been found to be more 
likely- with the exception of Eastern Germany - to ‘drop-out’ to part-time work. We found 
that the presence of young children in the home continues to be a major incentive for women 
to leave full-time employment, and even found some, very small, effects of an increase in the 
drop-out rate of women with young children in Germany over time.  
 
There are few papers which test the impact of power inequalities between couples, in terms 
of earnings and housework contributions, on her supply. We found both variables were 
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strongly predictive in the UK and Western Germany, but our analyses revealed that the 
number of children in the household to be the most powerful predictor of transitions to part-
time employment. This underscores the ongoing issues with poor access to childcare in these 
contexts. We expected Eastern Germany to be the most successful at attenuating the impact 
of between-couple inequalities on her labour supply and to be the least gender-essentialist 
in its working and earning strategies. This was confirmed: in Eastern Germany women with 
young children were not more likely to drop-out to part-time, while they were in Western 
Germany and the UK. Similarly, housework inequalities had no significant effects on drop-out 
and earnings inequalities were less predictive of drop-out in the Eastern German context.  
 
Finally, our trend analysis using the latest available data went against our expectation. All 
theory on the topic suggests either a maintenance in tendencies for household specialization, 
a stalled revolution, or a positive (but slow) trend towards equal outcomes. We had therefore 
hypothesised a reduced tendency for women to leave full-time jobs for part-time ones over 
time. Instead, we found an increased likelihood for women to ‘drop-out’ of full-time to part-
time work in both Eastern and Western Germany, this finding is suggestive of increased 
specialisation over time and of ongoing incompatibilities in the institutional support for equal 
dual-earning in Germany.  
 
There are several important avenues for future research. One would be to uncover how best 
to support women in their pursuit of full-time work, with a twin strategy required that covers 
both issues arising from incompatibilities in the workplace as well as ones concerning ongoing 
and resistant inequalities in the home. However, increasing women’s ability to work full-time 
throughout the life-course is not the only possible strategy to achieve gender equality in the 
labour market. Policy initiatives and cultural change that enable and encourage men to ‘lean 
in’ in the domestic sphere and reduce their working time is another strategy to reduce the 
amount of economic and labour market inequality between men and women. Such a change 
would allow both partners to reduce their working hours during ‘family intensive years’ (e.g. 
while the children are small). If both partners cut back their working hours, they could work 
long-hours part-time which are less detrimental in terms of career prospects (see 
Allmendinger, 2016). A second avenue for future research would thus be to investigate the 
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contextual conditions under which such a dual long-hours part-time working strategy can be 
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Source: SOEP data 1992-2012 for Germany, BHPS 1992-2008 and BHPS sample 2010-2012 of the UKHLS for the 
UK, own calculations.  
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Table 1.  Transitions  from Full-time to Part-time, reference staying in Full-time Employment, with 
corrections for selection into employment. Probit estimations. 





Breadwinning Status    
Female breadwinner, non-poor (ref.)    
Female Secondary-Earner, non-poor partner 0.35*** 0.74*** 0.47*** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Female Secondary-earner, poor partner  0.62 0.52 0.31 
  (0.63) (0.63) (0.37) 
Female breadwinner, poor  0.90*** 0.82*** 0.07 
  (0.24) (0.20) (0.23) 
Dual-earner 0.03 0.26*** 0.20** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Housework Allocation    
Equal housework contribution (ref.)    
Female does more housework than partner  0.09 0.20** 0.14† 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Female does less housework than partner -0.02 -0.01 0.09 
  (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) 
Number of Children in the home    
# of children between 0 and 4 0.18 0.98*** 0.90*** 
  (0.14) (0.08) (0.07) 
# of children between 5 and 11 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.08† 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
# of children between 12 and 18 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.05 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Annual Time Trend  0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Inverse Mills ratio 0.22 -0.43* 0.62*** 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) 
Constant  -44.29*** -36.31*** 14.50 
  (11.68) (9.34) (11.70) 
Sample N /N Transition to Part-time at t. 6,147/422 8,649/729 7595/765 
Log Likelihood Full model -1430 -2193 -2128 
Log Likelihood (minus breadwinning status) -1450 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
40,2*** 
-2273 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
160,67*** 
-2156 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
55,9*** 
Log Likelihood (minus # of children in home) -1445.0158 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
28.43*** 
-2297.1627 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
207.03*** 
-2255 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
253.34*** 
Log Likelihood (minus housework allocation) -1432.3538 
LR-Test Ch2 = 3.03 
 
-2202.3146 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
17.33** 
-2130 
LR-Test Ch2 = 
3.66 
Source: SOEP 1992-2012 for Germany, BHPS 1992-2008 for the UK, own calculations. Estimated Coefficients. 
Robust Standard errors controlling for person clusters in parenthesis. The models also control for: age, migration 
status, unemployment experience, changes in marital status, occupational group, firm-size, employment sector, 
household income, educational homogamy, changes in partner’s income, changes in partners working-time 
status. †p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01, ***p<.001.  
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APPENDIX: 





Germany United Kingdom 
Full-time at t-1, Full-time at t 0.38 0.20 0.31 
Full-time at t-1,  Part-time at t 0.03 0.02 0.05 
Part-time at t-1, to Part-time at t 0.11 0.24 0.24 
Part-time at t-1, to Full-time at t 0.03 0.02 0.05 
Inactivity at t-1, to Inactivity at t 0.18 0.24 0.21 
Inactivity at t-1, to Full-time at t 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Inactivity at t-1, to Part-time at t 0.03 0.04 0.02 
Full-time at t-1, to Inactivity at t 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Part-time at t-1, to Inactivity at t 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 Person Years 19,371 54,648 38,361 
Source: SOEP 1992-2012 for Germany, BHPS 1992-2008 for the UK, own calculations. 
 
 
Table A2.  Transitions from Part-time to Full-time, reference staying in Part-time, with corrections 







Breadwinning Status    
Female breadwinner, non-poor (ref.)    
Female Secondary-Earner, non-poor partner -0.17 -0.64*** -0.57*** 
Female Secondary-earner, poor partner  -0.3 -0.98† -0.53* 
Female breadwinner, poor  -0.04 -0.52*** -0.58*** 
Dual-earner -0.22† -0.08 0.14 
Housework Allocation    
Equal housework contribution (ref.)    
Female does more housework than partner  -0.23* -0.26** -0.17† 
Female does less housework than partner 0.05 0.01 0.06 
Number of Children in the home    
# of children between 0 and 4 -0.36** -0.41*** -0.44*** 
# of children between 5 and 11 -0.36*** -0.26*** -0.19*** 
# of children between 12 and 18 -0.18* -0.09*** 0.01 
Annual Time Trend  -0.01† 0.00 0.00 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.58*** -0.20 -0.16 
Constant  30.27† 9.23 -5.01 
Sample N/N Transition to Full-time at t 2,034/405 10,796/805 7,724/707 
Source: SOEP 1992-2012 for Germany, BHPS 1992-2008 for the UK, own calculations. Estimated Coefficients 
(robust standard errors controlling for person clusters). The models also control for: age, migration status, 
unemployment experience, changes in marital status, occupational group, firm-size, employment sector, 
household income, educational homogamy, changes in partner’s income, changes in partners working-time 
status.  †p<.10 *p<.05 **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
 






Table A3. Sample Means of Within Household Inequalities. 
 Eastern Germany Western Germany United Kingdom 
 1992 2012 1992 2012 1992 2008/2012 
Housework Allocation % % % % % % 
Equal housework 
contribution 
8.49 14.25 5.97 14.10 4.94 7.16# 
Female does more 
housework than partner 
83.97 73.43 89.62 77.03 87.55 80.11# 
Female does less 
housework than partner 
7.55 12.32 4.41 8.87 7.51 12.72# 
 
Mean monthly between-
couple earned income 
difference 
€350 €658 €1,354 €1,943 £709 £1,087 
Source: SOEP, BHPS, UKHLS, own calculations. Selection: All women in partnerships with non-missing 
values on labor status and educational level, aged between 20 and 59 years.#This variable is only available in the 
original BHPS 1992-2008 sample and was not measured in a consistent manner in the UKHLS data. 
 
 
 
